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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20040426-CA

v.
MICHAEL CLEGG,
Defendant/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count of theft by
deception with two prior convictions, a third degree felony (R.
132-33)•

This court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (West 2005).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court plainly err in submitting the case

to the jury or did defendant's attorney render ineffective
assistance of counsel for not filing a motion for directed
verdict, where the evidence amply established that defendant
intentionally deceived the cashier into selling him items at a
price lower than their retail value?
To prevail on a claim of plain error, defendant must
demonstrate that the trial court erred, that the error should

have been obvious, and that, absent the error, he had a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome.
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).

State v.

In reviewing a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court must determine
whether trial counsel's performance was deficient and, if so,
whether the deficient performance prejudiced defendant.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v.
Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah App. 1991).

This claim presents

a question of law, reviewed on the record of the underlying
trial.

See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 111 16-17, L2 P.3d

92.
2.

Would the outcome of the trial likely have been more

favorable for defendant if defense counsel had requested or the
trial court had given a jury instruction that did not apply to
the facts of this case?
Defendant frames this argument both in terms of ineffective
assistance of counsel and plain error by the trial court.

When

both claims turn on the same set of facts, "a common standard is
applicable."

State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 n. 15 (Utah

1989) . Both claims require that defendant establish prejudice or
harm to the extent that the reviewing court's confidence in the
outcome is undermined.

Id.
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3.

Did the trial judge plainly err either by referencing

his spouse's employment as a pharmacist at Walmart or by
admonishing defendant about his disruptive courtroom behavior?
The standard of review for a plain error claim is
articulated in issue #1, supra.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (West 2005), governing theft by
deception, provides:
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or
exercises control over property of another by
deception and with a purpose to deprive him
thereof.
(2) Theft by deception does not occur,
however, when there is only falsity as to
matters having no pecuniary significance, or
puffing by statements unlikely to deceive
ordinary persons in the group addressed.
"Puffing" means an exaggerated commendation
of wares or worth in communications addressed
to the public or to a class or group.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401(5) (West 2005), defining
"deception," provides:
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person
intentionally:
(a) Creates or confirms by words or
conduct an impression of law or fact
that is false and that the actor does
not believe to be true and that is
likely to affect the judgment of another
in the transaction

-3-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count of theft by deception,
enhanced to a third degree felony because he had two prior
convictions (R. 24-25).

After a preliminary hearing, he was

bound over for trial, and a jury convicted him as charged (R. 2122, 51, 106). The trial court sentenced defendant to zero to
five years in the Utah State Prison, to be served concurrently
with sentences in three other cases (R. 132-35).

Defendant filed

this timely appeal (R. 137-40).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On November 28, 2001, Rainbow Palmer had been working as a
Walmart cashier for approximately one month (R. 203: 114) . That
evening, defendant and a friend came through her check stand with
two carts full of merchandise, totaling $344.66 (R. 203: 114,
117; R. 204: 169). Rainbow testified that as she checked
defendant out, "[he] was talking to me the whole entire time,
kind of confusing me and sidetracking me" (Id. at 118). She
described him as "jittery," "just talking and talking and talking
and talking" (Id. at 125, 136), She thought "he looked like he
was under the influence of drugs" (Id. at 136). Rainbow
described herself as feeling "very nervous" because of
defendant's constant chatter and because she knew her customer
service manager was watching her performance (Id. at 125, 136).
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In the course of checking out, defendant handed Rainbow
three unpackaged items: a butane torch head, an air pressure
gauge, and a plastic sprinkler adapter (Id. at 73, 119). Rainbow
looked for UPC stickers on the items but there were none (Id.).
She testified:
[Defendant] had handed me a piece of paper
that said $2.74 with the little UPC thing on
the bottom . . . . He said that, "These three
items I found in the bulk back in hardware,
and these are the prices." I said, "Are you
sure?" He said yes. Because that's the only
kind of authority I have as a Walmart
associate is to say, "Are you sure?"
(Id. at 120-21).

Rainbow took "his word because at Walmart we go

with customer satisfaction" (Id. at 119). She said, "I had a
doubt, but I didn't question him" (Id.).

Rainbow then rang all

three items up at the price marked on the card: $2.74 (Id. at
121) -1
Unbeknownst to defendant, who had spent a considerable
amount of time in the store, his conduct had attracted the
attention of several Walmart loss prevention team members (Id. at
92).

Initially, a loss prevention agent observed defendant

acting suspiciously and so contacted John Marketti, the loss
prevention trainer (Id. at 57-58).

Marketti testified that he

had followed and watched defendant for "at least an hour" (Id. at
63).

He observed defendant "just acting in a really peculiar
1

The actual cost of the complete butane torch was $12.97;
the air pressure gauge cost $14.96; and the sprinkler adapter
cost approximately $3.70 (R. 204: 226).
-5-

manner" (Id. at 60). Defendant was "pacing up and down the
aisle," "looking around to the left, to the right," "moving very
sporadically through the store . . . almost to a pace where we
had to . . .jog just to keep up" (Id. at 60, 62).
Following defendant around the hardware department, Marketti
watched defendant pick up a butane torch box, open it, remove
only the torch head, put it in his cart, and then return the
opened box with its remaining parts to a nearby shelf (Id. at 6061).

Later, in the automotive department, Marketti saw defendant

rip open a package containing an air pressure gauge, put the
gauge in his basket, and then place the opened package behind
some other items on a shelf (Id. at 63).
The Walmart district supervisor, Bill Mowry, testified that
he was only five feet away, just opposite defendant in the same
aisle, when defendant took the butane torch box from the shelf,
removed the torch head, and then replaced the box on the shelf
(R. 204: 211, 228).2

Tyler Wilm, another loss prevention agent,

also testified that he saw defendant take both the torch head and
the air pressure gauge (R. 203: 142-43, 145).
John Marketti watched defendant check out from about 10 feet
away (Id. at 87) . He testified that defendant produced NNa price
tag card of $2.74.

Basically, he showed that card to the cashier

2

John Marketti and Tyler Wilm were watching defendant from
either end of the same aisle in which Mowry and defendant were
standing (R. 204: 211) .
-6-

and basically held out these items [i.e. the butane torch head,
the air pressure gauge, and the plastic sprinkler adapter],
making gestures that these items were that price for each one"
(Id. at 66). Marketti testified that he was "99 percent sure" of
the content of the conversation (Id. at 98). He also testified
that the price card, which typically hung from a shelf to
indicate the price of merchandise, in fact showed the price for a
multi-purpose glue (Id. at 67, 68).3
Tyler Wilm watched the checkout on an overhead surveillance
camera, observing defendant "present[] all of his merchandise
that he paid for first and then these last two items [i.e. the
torch head and pressure gauge] he placed on the belt last along
with a tag - shelf label which he had selected also from the
hardware department that he presented to the cashier" (Id. at
143) .
After defendant finished checking out, he headed for the
store exit.

Once past all points of payment, the loss prevention

team stopped him (Id. at 71, 148). The butane torch head, the
air pressure gauge, and the plastic sprinkler adapter were all
found in his shopping bags (Id. at 73). When matched to
3

Marketti conceded that the glue was located right above
the sprinkler adapters and that defendant could conceivably have
taken the card from between the shelves, thinking it applied to
the adapter (R. 203: 100-01). He emphasized, however, "the
regular person would just, you know, . . . have a price check
done. They wouldn't carry that thing with them and say that that
price is for that item and the two other items that they . . .
took out of the packaging" (Id. at 102).
-7-

defendant's receipt, none of the items showed up by name or
proper price (Id. at 74). Three items, however, each priced at
$2.74, did appear, "back-to-back three in a row" (Id.).

When

questioned, defendant told Bill Mowry that he had paid for the
torch head, the pressure gauge, and the sprinkler adapter (R.
204: 242).
Defendant testified in his own behalf.

He asserted that he

had spent a long time at Walmart on two successive evenings,
shopping both for his business partner and for parts he could use
in his own inventions (Id. at 166, 168). Although he sought help
from Walmart personnel, no one was available (Id. at 168).
Consequently, he opened the butane torch and the pressure gauge
packages to assess for himself whether the thread patterns were
what he needed for his work (Id. at 168-69).

He discovered they

were not but nonetheless put the items in his basket (Id. at 170,
184).

Defendant also found a plastic sprinkler adapter that "was

perfect for what I wanted, but it wasn't in a package" (Id. at
169) . Seeing a nearby price card, he took it from the shelf,
thinking it indicated the price of the adapter (Id.).
Defendant testified that at check out, he told the cashier
that he did not want to buy either the torch head or the pressure
gauge (Id. at 170, 178, 184). He did, however, want to purchase
the plastic sprinkler adapter (Id. at 178). Consequently, he
presented the price card to Rainbow and said, "I don't know if
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this [i.e. the price card] is this [i.e. the sprinkler adapter]"
(Id. at 171). He testified, "I handed her the thing [i.e. the
price card].

It's her job to tell me" (Id.).

According to

defendant, she agreed that the card seemed to go with the adapter
and rang it up (Id.).
In defendant's view, he never intended to buy either the
torch head or the pressure gauge (Id. at 183-84).

He testified

that he gave both items to Rainbow, telling her he did not wish
to purchase them (Id. at 174). His intent, he maintained, was to
return the items from the opened packages to the front of the
store for restocking and to purchase only the sprinkler adapter
(Id. at 170, 184, 202). He testified that he did not see the
cashier put the items in his shopping bag because he thought she
was cute and was flirting with her as she checked him out (Id. at
169, 178, 183).
After the jury considered all of the evidence, it convicted
defendant of theft by deception (R. 106).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant first contends that the trial court plainly erred
by submitting the case to the jury because the evidence did not
suffice to establish a statutory "deception."

He argues that his

offer of a price was not "likely to affect the judgment" of a
more competent Walmart cashier, as required by the statute
defining deception.

Thus, where the cashier in this case freely
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chose to accept his offer, he is not culpable.

This argument

fails at the outset because it ignores two of the three elements
of the statutory definition of deception.

Moreover, his argument

ignores the close nexus between defendant's words and conduct and
the transaction.

When all the evidence of defendant's conduct is

examined, there was ample evidence for the jury to conclude that
defendant committed theft by deception.

Defendant's related

argument, that his counsel was ineffective for failing to move
for a directed verdict, also fails.

If the evidence was

sufficient to support a conviction, then moving for a directed
verdict would have been futile and, hence, not grounds for an
ineffectiveness claim.
Second, defendant argues that the outcome of the trial would
have been more favorable if his counsel had requested or the
trial court had sua sponte given a jury instruction on "puffing,"
a statutory defense to theft by deception.

This argument is

unavailing, not only because defendant never argued puffing as a
defense below, but also because the facts of this case simply do
not involve puffing.

Plainly, failure to instruct the jury on an

inapplicable defense could not have prejudiced the outcome of the
case.
Finally, the trial judge did not plainly err either by
mentioning his spouse's employment as a Walmart pharmacist or by
admonishing defendant about his disruptive courtroom behavior.
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As to spousal employment, the remarks may well have been
gratuitous.

Defendant, however, has failed to explain how the

alleged error was obvious and how the absence of those remarks
would have realistically created a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable outcome.

As to the behavioral admonishment, it is

the court's prerogative and responsibility to control the
courtroom and manage the proceedings.

Mere expressions of

annoyance and even anger by the court are ordinarily insufficient
to support a bias charge.

Here, where the jury was the fact

finder, defendant has failed to persuasively demonstrate any
connection between the court's comment and the substantive
outcome of the case.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR
IN SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE JURY
NOR DID DEFENSE COUNSEL RENDER
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
FOR NOT FILING A MOTION FOR
DIRECTED VERDICT WHERE THE EVIDENCE
AMPLY ESTABLISHED THAT DEFENDANT
INTENTIONALLY DECEIVED THE CASHIER
INTO SELLING HIM ITEMS AT AN
INCORRECT PRICE
Defendant first argues that the trial court committed plain
error by submitting the case to the jury because the evidence did
not suffice to establish a "deception" within the meaning of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-401(5).

See Br. of Aplt. at 24-25.

Because

defendant did not preserve the issue at trial by filing an
-11-

appropriate motion, he relies on a plain error argument on
appeal.

See State v. Holqate, 2000 UT 74, 116, 10 P.3d 346

(generally, in order to preserve issue for appeal, defendant must
raise sufficiency claim by proper motion).

"[T]o establish plain

error, a defendant must demonstrate first that the evidence was
insufficient to support a conviction of the crime charged and
second that the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that
the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury."
at 111.

Id.

Only after the defendant convincingly makes an initial

showing of insufficiency will the appellate court "determine
whether the evidentiary defect was so obvious and fundamental
that it was plain error to submit the case to the jury."

Id. at

518.
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to
establish a statutory deception because the State did not show
that any false communication he made or implied to the cashier as
to the price of the three items at issue [was] ^likely to affect'
her judgment" (Br. of Aplt. at 26). 4 This argument turns on Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-401(5), defining "deception" as follows:
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person
intentionally:

4

Defendant makes another, essentially identical argument,
based not on section 76-6-401 (5) (a), but on an inapplicable
subsection of the theft by deception statute. See Br. of Aplt.
at 28-29. This argument is addressed comprehensively in Point
Two of the State's brief.
-12-

(a) Creates or confirms by words or
conduct an impression of law or fact
that is false and that the actor does
not believe to be true and that is
likely to affect the judgment of another
in the transaction
The essence of defendant's argument is that his misleading words
and actions were unlikely to affect the judgment of a more
competent Walmart cashier than the one he happened to approach.
He asserts that the cashier "made a choice not to follow
procedures, not to contact her CSM [customer service manager],
and not to do a price check on the three items.

[Defendant]

simply made an offer of a price which was accepted by the
cashier'' (Br. of Aplt. at 28).

In defendant's view, then, making

a purchase at Walmart constitutes an exercise in bartering,
governed by a "seller beware" rule of law.
Defendant's argument lacks merit for several reasons.
First, it guts the statutory definition of deception by ignoring
the first two elements of the definition.

In defendant's view, a

buyer can knowingly create a false impression, but if the cashier
accepts his false impression, then no deception has occurred.
Such an interpretation violates the plain language of the statute
and, for that reason, should be rejected.

See, e.g., State v.

Martinez, 2002 UT 80, 58, 52 P.3d 1276 (when interpreting
statutes, look first to plain statutory language and avoid
interpretations that render portions of statute superfluous) .
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Second, defendant misinterprets the statutory phrase,
"likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction," by
assuming that the response of the cashier in the transaction
defines his culpability for a deception, regardless of his intent
or conduct.

This Court has noted, however, that the phrase is

meant "to test the relationship between the falsehood and the
transaction, so as to determine if a deception exists."
LeFevre, 825 P.2d 681, 686 n.9 (Utah App. 1992).

State v.

Here, the

testimony of all witnesses, including defendant, demonstrated a
close nexus between defendant's falsehood and the transaction.
John Marketti, the Walmart loss prevention trainer, testified
that he personally saw defendant remove both the butane torch
head from its box and the pressure gauge from its packaging and
then put both items in his cart (R. 203: 60, 63). He also
personally watched as defendant showed the cashier a price tag of
$2.74 and then gestured that the items, plus a sprinkler adapter,
were that price (Id. at 66) .
Tyler Wilm, a loss prevention agent, testified that he also
saw defendant remove the butane torch head and the pressure gauge
from their packaging, and that he saw defendant put these items
on the belt, along with a shelf label that defendant had procured
in the hardware department (Id. at 142, 143, 145).
Bill Mowry, a Walmart district supervisor, testified that he
was less than five feet away when defendant removed the butane

-14-

torch head from the box and returned the box to the shelf (R.
204: 211). He further testified that after he stopped defendant,
defendant denied removing any items from their packaging and
maintained he had paid for the torch, the gauge, and the adapter
(Id. at 217, 242). Mowry also testified that he saw defendant
hand the cashier the $2.74 price tag before she rung up the three
items (Id^ at 225).
Rainbow Palmer, the cashier, testified that when she reached
the three unpackaged items, she asked defendant about the lack of
wrapping.

He told her that he found the three items in a bulk

section in hardware and handed her a price tag of $2.74 (R. 203:
119-22, 135-36) . Because none of the items displayed UPC
stickers and Walmart "goes with customer satisfaction,'' Rainbow
asked him, "Are you sure?" and he responded that he was.

Only

then did she ring each item up at $2.74 (Id. at 119r 120-21).
Even the testimony of defendant illustrates the closeness of
the nexus between his conduct and words and the transaction.
Defendant admitted removing both the torch head from its box and
the pressure gauge from its packaging (R. 204: 168). He put the
items in his basket and brought them to the checkout stand (Id.
at 170, 180, 183-84, 202). He also testified that he removed a
$2.74 price card that he found on the shelf near a sprinkler
adapter he wanted to buy and brought the price card with him to
expedite his checkout (Id. at 168, 178, 181-82).

-15-

He also

admitted handing all three items to the cashier, along with the
price card (Id. at 171, 174) .
Under these circumstances, the evidence sufficed to show
that defendant's representations created an impression of fact
that was not true, both to the cashier and to other witnesses in
the store.

Whether defendant also knew these representations to

be false depends on a credibility assessment, plainly within the
province of the jury as fact-finder.

Seey e.g.. State v.

Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) (jury serves as exclusive
judge of both credibility of witnesses and weight to be accorded
the evidence).

Certainly, given the testimony of all the store

personnel, defendant's conduct was plainly likely to affect the
judgment of a cashier checking out a customer who made such
representations.

No more is necessary to establish a deception

within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. 76-6-401(5)(a).
Defendant also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to move for a directed verdict on the ground that the
evidence was insufficient to establish a deception.
Aplt. at 30.
succeed

See Br. of

Defendant acknowledges that such a claim can only

A>>

if the State's evidence was not sufficient to support a

conviction.'" Id. (quoting State v. Reves, 2000 UT App 310, 56).
But

x>

[s]o long as there is some evidence, including reasonable

inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of
the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops."
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State v.

Mead, 2001 UT 58, 167, 27 P.3d 1115 (quotation and citation
omitted).

Here, the evidence sufficed to establish that

defendant deceived the cashier within the meaning of the relevant
statute.

Accordingly, had defense counsel moved for a directed

verdict, the trial court would have denied the motion.
motion, therefore, would have been futile.

Such a

The law is well-

settled that trial counsel's failure to raise a futile objection
cannot be grounds for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 2000 UT 41, 526, 1 P.3d 546.
POINT TWO
THE OUTCOME OF THE TRIAL WOULD
LIKELY HAVE BEEN NO MORE FAVORABLE
TO DEFENDANT IF DEFENSE COUNSEL HAD
REQUESTED OR THE TRIAL COURT HAD
GIVEN A JURY INSTRUCTION THAT DID
NOT APPLY TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE
The statutory definition of theft by deception, with which
the jury was instructed, provides that "[a] person commits theft
if he obtains or exercises control over property of another by
deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof."
Ann. § 76-6-405(1) (West 2005).

Utah Code

Under the rubrics of plain error

and ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant asserts that he
should have received an instruction on a second subsection of the
same statute, which articulates a defense to theft by deception.
That section provides:
(2) Theft by deception does not occur,
however, when there is only falsity as to
matters having no pecuniary significance, or
-17-

puffing by statements unlikely to deceive
ordinary persons in the group addressed.
"Puffing" means an exaggerated commendation
of wares or worth in communications addressed
to the public or to a class or group.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405(2).
Pursuant to ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant
contends "that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to
request that the jury be instructed on the entire statutory
definition of theft by deception - which included the defense set
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405(2)."

Br. of Aplt. at 31. He

asserts that he was prejudiced because his defense "was
implicitly based on the statutory defense of subsection (2)" and
that, had the jury been so instructed, the outcome of his trial
would likely have been more favorable.

Id. at 34.5

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a
showing of deficient performance and prejudice.

State v.

Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 11 16-17, 12 P.3d 92. Where subsection
(2) of the theft by deception statute does not apply to the facts
of his case, defendant fails to show either.

5

Consequently, a

Defendant also contends that the trial court committed
plain error when it failed to inform the jury of the entire
statutory definition of theft by deception. Br. of Aplt. at 33.
A claim of plain error requires a showing of obvious legal error
and prejudice. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).
As explained infra, the court did not commit error because
subsection (2) was inapplicable to the facts before the court.
For the same reason, defendant could not have suffered any
prejudice. And even if there had been error, it would not have
been obvious where defendant failed to object to the instruction
as given.
-18-

jury instruction that included subsection (2) could make no
possible difference to the outcome of his case.
By its plain language, the statutory defense articulated in
subsection (2) rests on one of two conditions: either there must
be "falsity as to matters having no pecuniary significance," or
"puffing by statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in
the group addressed."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405(2).

Defendant

asserts only the latter circumstance, that his actions at check
out constituted "puffing" (Br. of Aplt. at 33).
The statutory defense in subsection (2) defines "puffing" as
"an exaggerated commendation of wares or worth in communications
addressed to the public or to a class or group."6

It thus refers

to exaggerated talk or braggadocio, usually uttered by a
who is trying to influence a buyer.

seller

In the context of theft by

deception, a classic example of puffing would be a car dealer who

6

The term "puffing" is most typically used in the
commercial law context and has been described as "*[t]he general
praise of his own wares by a seller . . . for the purpose of
enhancing them in the buyer's estimation.'" Boud v. SDNCO, Inc.,
2002 UT 83, 1 13 n.2, 54 P.3d 1131 (quoting Hirshberg Optical Co.
v. Dalton, Nye & Cannon Co., 27 P.3d 83 (1891). In older cases,
puffing is referred to as "sales talk." See, e.g., Christopher
v. Larson Ford Sales, Inc., 557 P.2d 1009, 1013 (Utah 1976);
Welchman v. Wood, 353 P.2d 165, 167 (Utah 1960). In the criminal
context, this Court has suggested that a defendant's statement to
an officer that he was not afraid of a man named Olsen and could
"kick Olson's ass" might well be "^macho' hyperbole rather than a
definitive admission that defendant had no fear of Olsen" and
thus an example of "the criminal law equivalent of ^puffing.'"
State v. Moritzsky, 771 P.2d 688, 693 (Utah App. 1989).
-19-

overstates the value or condition of a used car to a prospective
customer.

The dealer's "exaggerated commendation'' would involve

praise that enlarges beyond the bounds of truth, that
misrepresents by inflating value beyond what is warranted by
fact.

See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 456, 790

(1993).
This case does not involve puffing.
buyer, not the seller.

Defendant was the

Moreover, he did not overstate the value

of the items in his cart.

He understated their value by

presenting a price tag that corresponded to a less expensive
item.

Under such circumstances, defendant could not successfully

assert puffing as a defense to theft by deception.

Accordingly,

his counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to request an
instruction on puffing as a defense, and defendant suffered no
prejudice as a result.
POINT THREE
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT PLAINLY ERR
EITHER BY REFERENCING HIS SPOUSE'S
EMPLOYMENT AS A PHARMACIST AT
WALMART OR BY ADMONISHING DEFENDANT
ABOUT HIS DISRUPTIVE COURTROOM
BEHAVIOR
Defendant argues that the trial court twice committed plain
error: first, by referencing his wife's employment as a
pharmacist at Walmart; and second, by admonishing defendant to
control his erratic behavior during trial.
36-37, 38-39.

See Br. of Aplt. at

Defendant asserts that "the trial court's comments
-20-

at the very least created the appearance of bias" (Id. at 36).
At most, he contends, these comments bolstered the State's case,
thereby tipping the scales against him and, consequently,
prejudicing the outcome of his trial (Id. at 41).
Defendant brings his claim under the rubric of plain error
because he did not follow the normal channel for asserting and
preserving a claim of judicial bias by filing a motion to
disqualify the judge.

See State v. Tueller, 2001 UT App 317, 19,

37 P.3d 1180; Utah R. Crim. P. 29(c) (West 2004).

To prevail on a

claim of plain error, defendant must demonstrate that the trial
court erred, that the error should have been obvious, and that,
absent the error, he had a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable outcome.

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah

1993).
A.

Trial judge's comments about spousal employment.

Defendant first complains that the court plainly erred in
commenting about his wife's employment as a pharmacist at Walmart
(Br. of Aplt. at 36-38).

Specifically, he asserts that the court

erred in making "unnecessary and inappropriate" remarks that
"highlight[ed] [the trial court's] family's connection to
Walmart" (Id. at 37, 38). Notably, however, Defendant concedes
that he "is not arguing here that the trial court committed plain
error in failing to recuse himself because his wife worked at the
Walmart store" (Br. of Aplt. at 38). Rather, his claim seems
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limited to an assertion that the trial court should not have
mentioned his wife's employment in front of the jury because a
reasonable juror would then question the court's impartiality
(Id.).

Defendant so frames the issue in order to fit "the basic

test cited by this Court in reviewing the trial court's denial of
a recusal motion" (Id.).
recusal motion.

Defendant, however, did not file a

Consequently, his claim must be considered under

the rubric of plain error, not as an appeal from the denial of a
motion to disqualify.
The judge made two remarks to which defendant now objects.
The first occurred during jury voir dire, where the following
interchange occurred:
Court:

Now let me first ask what may seem
to be a very peculiar question. Do
any of you work for Walmart
Corporation, either at stores or at
the distribution center? If you do
would you raise your hand? All
right, I've got a hand. Ma'am,
what's your name?

Juror:

Crystal Hyatt.

Court:

All right. Ms. Hyatt, I'm going to
excuse you right now, and that's
not unusual. My wife also works
for Walmart. She's a pharmacist
for them right now. But Walmart is
involved in this case and so we're
excusing anybody who's from
Walmart. Thank you, Ms. Hyatt.
You can go.
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R. 203: 8-9.

The second remark occurred at the end of the first

day of trial when, in admonishing the jury to refrain from
discussing the case, the judge said:
Do any of you have crying need to go to the
Walmart in Washington today? I have to go
there and pick up my wife from work, but I'm
not going to try to learn anything about the
case there; I promise you. Please don't do
that yourself.
Id. at 160.
Defendant contends that the impropriety of these remarks
"should have been patently obvious to the trial court" (Id. at
38).

He alleges that the remarks prejudiced the outcome of his

trial because the evidence for conviction was so marginal that,
absent the comments, he would have enjoyed a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome (Id. at 41).7
Even assuming arguendo, however, that the trial court's
comment was "inappropriate," defendant has only speculated that
any alleged error was either obvious or prejudicial.

"To show

obviousness of the error, [defendant] must show that the law was
clear at the time of trial."

State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19,

56, 18 P.3d 1123; accord State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah
App. 1997) ("Utah courts have repeatedly held that a trial court's

7

The role of a pharmacist in a large corporate entity,
however, so significantly attenuated from the retail functions
implicated in this case that it is difficult to see how the
judge's reference to his wife's employment could be construed as
anything more than a gratuitous or unnecessary remark, much less
a prejudicial one.
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error is not plain where there is no settled appellate law to
guide the trial court").

In this case, defendant has not cited —

nor could he cite — any legal authority rendering such a comment
legally wrong.
Furthermore, defendant has failed to demonstrate that,
absent the comments, the outcome of the trial would have been
more favorable to him.

And, indeed, it would not have been.

The

jury was the fact finder, not the judge; defendant concedes that
the jury was properly instructed on its role as fact finder; and
the evidence against defendant was substantial.

Because

defendant has wholly failed to demonstrate how the judge's
passing comments about his wife's employment could have convinced
a jury to convict him, his claim fails.
B.

Trial judge's admonishment of defendant.

Defendant also argues that the trial court committed plain
error by admonishing him about his disruptive courtroom behavior.
See Br. of Aplt. at 38-40.

Following cross examination of a

prosecution witness, just before redirect examination, the court
interjected:
Give me just a minute. Mr. Clegg, I have
patiently put up with your unusual behavior,
your untoward behavior, your outbursts, your
fighting with your counsel, the miserable
display that you have put on while seated
there at counsel table. You will now sit
quietly and still for the rest of these
proceedings. Don't make any noises. Don't
move your arms or hands. Don't move your
head. Be still.
-24-

R. 204: 241.

Defendant argues that this statement "was

inappropriate and demonstrated bias against him which influenced
the jury" (Br. of Aplt. at 39). The error, he contends, was
obvious because "it did not promote judicial impartiality" (Id.
at 40). He asserts it was prejudicial because it "highlighted
the disdain and frustration the trial court felt towards him"
(Id. at 41).
Defendant's argument fails because he has not demonstrated
error, much less that it was both obvious and prejudicial.

The

law is well-settled that the court has not only the prerogative
but also the inherent power to control the courtroom and manage
the trial process.

State v. Harrison, 2001 UT 33, 59, 24 P.3d

936; State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, 570, 979 P.2d 799. Here,
defendant himself concedes that he "offer[ed] verbal
interjections during the testimony of other witnesses" and
"verbally disagreed with his counsel" on multiple occasions (Br.
of Aplt. at 38). The court tolerated defendant's repeated
interruptions until the last witness testified, at which point
the court finally intervened.
This Court has noted that "[m]ere ^expressions of
impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger' are
insufficient to establish the existence of bias or partiality."
Campbell, Maack & Sessions v. DeBrv, 2001 UT App 397, 525, 38
P.3d 984 (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56
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(1994)).

Similarly, remarks that are "^critical or disapproving

of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases,
ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge.'" Id.
Where defendant objects to the trial court's comments
seeking only to modify defendant's aberrant conduct, those
comments, without more, are insufficient to establish trial court
error.

And, in any event, "for ^alleged bias . . . to be

disqualifying [it] must . . . result in an opinion on the merits
on some basis other than what the judge learned from his
participation in the case.'" Id. (citation omitted).

In this

case, where the fact finding function rested exclusively with the
jury, defendant has failed to persuasively demonstrate any
connection between the court's comment and the substantive
outcome of the case.

For this additional reason, defendant's

claim fails.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
conviction on one count of theft by deception with two prior
convictions, a third degree felony.
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